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= Immigration and the Fiscal Burden on the Dutch Welfare State = |
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-The 2023 report //Borderless Welfare State// presents a comprehensive analysis of immigration's impact on Dutch public finances. Between 1995 and 2019, immigration—including the second generation—incurred a net fiscal cost of approximately €400 billion. Projections indicate that, if current patterns continue, this figure could exceed €1 trillion by 2040. |
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+The 2023 report *Borderless Welfare State* presents a comprehensive analysis of immigration's impact on Dutch public finances. Between 1995 and 2019, immigration—including the second generation—incurred a net fiscal cost of approximately €400 billion. Projections indicate that, if current patterns continue, this figure could exceed €1 trillion by 2040. |
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This cost arises from increased per capita spending on education, healthcare, social security, and justice services for immigrants, combined with lower average tax contributions. In 2016 alone, the net fiscal cost of immigration peaked at €32 billion. |
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+== Fiscal Impact by Immigration Motive == |
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-{{expandable summary="Study: Borderless Welfare State – The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the Netherlands"}} |
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-**Source:** *Demo-Demo Publisher (Netherlands)* |
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-**Date of Publication:** *2023* |
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-**Author(s):** *Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog, Gerrit Kreffer* |
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-**Title:** *"Borderless Welfare State: Immigration and the Sustainability of Dutch Public Finances"* |
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-**DOI:** N/A |
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-**Subject Matter:** *Immigration policy, fiscal sustainability, welfare state, demographic projections* |
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+Only labour migration contributes positively to public finances. All other immigration categories—study, family, and especially asylum—result in significant long-term fiscal burdens per person. |
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-{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}} |
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-1. **Total Net Cost (1995–2019):** ~€400 billion |
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-2. **Projected Cost by 2040:** Exceeds €1 trillion if trends continue |
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-3. **Annual Fiscal Cost in 2016:** €32 billion |
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-4. **Second Generation Still Net Negative:** Despite education improvements |
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-5. **Cito Score Correlation:** +€20,000 per 1-point increase |
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+|=Motive|=Labour|=Study|=Family|=Asylum| |
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+|Estimate A|125000|-75000|-275000|-475000| |
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+|Estimate B|125000|-75000|-275000|-475000| |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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-{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}} |
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-1. **By Immigration Motive:** |
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- Only labour immigration provides positive returns; all other categories result in high per-capita fiscal losses: |
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- (% id="immigrationMotive" %) |
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- |=Motive|=Labour|=Study|=Family|=Asylum| |
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- |Estimate A|125000|-75000|-275000|-475000| |
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- |Estimate B|125000|-75000|-275000|-475000| |
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- {{chart source="xdom" type="bar3D" |
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- params="table:immigrationMotive;range:B2-E3;series:columns; |
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- legendVisible:true; |
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- plotBorderVisible:false; |
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- backgroundColor:FFFFFF; |
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- plotBackgroundColor:F9F9F9; |
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- borderColor:FFFFFF; |
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- colors=4E79A7,F28E2B,E15759,76B7B2" |
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- title="Fiscal Impact by Immigration Motive (3D View)" |
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- width="800" height="360"}} |
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- {{/chart}} |
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+|=Region|=Western (avg.)|=Non-Western (avg.)|=Japan/NA/Oceania|=Morocco|=Horn of Africa/Sudan| |
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+|Estimate A|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| |
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+|Estimate B|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| |
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-2. **By Region of Origin:** |
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- Non-Western immigrants (especially from Africa and Islamic regions) impose major costs. Western migrants and those from Japan/NA/Oceania contribute positively: |
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- (% id="immigrationRegion" %) |
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- |=Region|=Western (avg.)|=Non-Western (avg.)|=Japan/NA/Oceania|=Morocco|=Horn of Africa/Sudan| |
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- |Estimate A|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| |
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- |Estimate B|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| |
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+== Fiscal Impact by Region of Origin == |
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- {{chart source="xdom" type="bar3D" |
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- params="table:immigrationRegion;range:B2-F3;series:columns; |
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- legendVisible:true; |
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- plotBorderVisible:false; |
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- backgroundColor:FFFFFF; |
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- plotBackgroundColor:F9F9F9; |
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- borderColor:FFFFFF; |
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- colors=4E79A7,F28E2B,E15759,76B7B2,59A14F" |
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- title="Fiscal Impact by Region of Origin (3D View)" |
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- width="800" height="360"}} |
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- {{/chart}} |
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+Migrants from Western countries have a marginally positive average net contribution. By contrast, migrants from non-Western regions impose large costs on the treasury, particularly those from Morocco and the Horn of Africa. Labour migrants from Japan, North America, and Oceania are the most fiscally beneficial group. |
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-3. **Demographic Pressure:** |
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- Keeping the dependency ratio stable would require a Dutch population of 100 million by 2100. |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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+|=Region|=Western (avg.)|=Non-Western (avg.)|=Japan/NA/Oceania|=Morocco|=Horn of Africa/Sudan| |
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+|Net Contribution (€)|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| |
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+``` |
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-{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}} |
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-1. **Strengths of the Study:** |
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- - Comprehensive longitudinal data (1995–2019) |
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- - Includes second-generation impacts |
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- - Links fiscal impact to demographic trends and education scores |
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+== Demographic and Policy Considerations == |
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-2. **Limitations:** |
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- - No sector-specific breakdowns (e.g. housing vs. justice vs. health) |
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- - Potential underestimation of intangible costs (e.g. cultural cohesion) |
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- - Cost of enforcement or return policies not included |
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+While immigration does increase the working-age population in the short term, the study finds it is not a sustainable solution to aging. Maintaining the current dependency ratio would require the Dutch population to grow to 100 million by the year 2100—a scenario the authors equate to a demographic Ponzi scheme. |
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-3. **Suggestions for Improvement:** |
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- - More granular demographic subcategories |
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- - Disaggregate Cito data by region and family structure |
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- - Model longer-term societal costs beyond fiscal metrics |
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+Even highly skilled labour migration from Western nations, when accompanied by chain migration (family reunification), is often not fiscally neutral. Asylum and family immigration are consistently the most costly, regardless of origin. |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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+== Educational Performance and Second Generation Outcomes == |
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-{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}} |
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-- Strong case study on how mass immigration undermines fiscal sustainability in a high-benefit Western welfare state |
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-- Reveals how family and asylum migration are structurally parasitic to national systems even across generations |
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-- Useful for countering claims that second-generation integration fully offsets first-generation costs |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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+Second-generation immigrants, despite educational gains, still tend to have lower net fiscal contributions than native Dutch. The study highlights a strong correlation between educational test scores (Cito) and fiscal performance. Each one-point increase in Cito score correlates with an approximate €20,000 increase in expected net lifetime contribution. |
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-{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}} |
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-1. Model impact of selective immigration by IQ/education on Dutch budget |
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-2. Compare Dutch trends to Sweden, UK, and France |
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-3. Evaluate cost of remittances and cultural alienation as externalities |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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+Children of Western labour and study migrants outperform their peers, while children of asylum and family migrants—particularly from Africa and the Islamic world—score significantly lower. Mixed-parent families (with one native Dutch parent) tend to show higher educational and fiscal outcomes. |
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-{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}} |
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-[[Download Full Study>>attach:SummaryEN.pdf]] |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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-{{/expandable}} |
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+== Conclusion == |
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+The report concludes that the current scale and composition of immigration is fiscally unsustainable. Without significant changes—especially in restricting asylum and low-skill family migration—the Dutch welfare state faces mounting and irreversible budgetary pressure. The authors advocate for selective immigration policies based on educational attainment, origin, and potential economic contribution. |
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