Wiki source code of Immigration
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1 | = Immigration in the United States = | ||
2 | |||
3 | Immigration has played a central role in shaping American demographics, politics, and identity. While the U.S. was founded and populated predominantly by Europeans, successive waves of immigration—both authorized and unauthorized—have transformed the nation's ethnic, cultural, and fiscal landscape. | ||
4 | |||
5 | == Early Immigration Policy and Restrictions == | ||
6 | |||
7 | === 1790 Naturalization Act === | ||
8 | The first federal law on naturalization limited U.S. citizenship to "**free White persons of good character**." This defined the racial boundaries of American citizenship at the time, explicitly excluding non-Whites and women from naturalization rights. | ||
9 | |||
10 | === 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act === | ||
11 | This act was the **first major federal law** to restrict immigration based on ethnicity. It banned all immigration of Chinese laborers for 10 years and laid the foundation for future exclusionary policies. | ||
12 | |||
13 | === 1924 Johnson-Reed Act === | ||
14 | Established a **quota system** that restricted immigration by national origin. Designed to maintain the "historic demographic composition" of the United States, it heavily favored Northern and Western Europeans and barred Asian immigrants entirely. | ||
15 | |||
16 | === 1965 Hart-Celler Act === | ||
17 | This landmark legislation **abolished national origin quotas** and shifted immigration priorities to **family reunification and skilled labor**. While intended to be moderate, it radically changed the **ethnic makeup** of U.S. immigration, leading to a surge from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. | ||
18 | |||
19 | == Projected Demographic Impact == | ||
20 | |||
21 | Recent projections by Camarota & Zeigler (2022) reveal that **immigration is responsible for nearly 90% of future U.S. population growth**, with long-term consequences for infrastructure, schools, and entitlement programs. | ||
22 | |||
23 | (% id="usPopulationProjection" %) | ||
24 | |=Year|=With Immigration|=Without Immigration| | ||
25 | |2020|331|331| | ||
26 | |2030|349|334| | ||
27 | |2040|368|336| | ||
28 | |2050|386|336| | ||
29 | |2060|404|336| | ||
30 | |||
31 | {{chart source="xdom" type="bar3D" | ||
32 | params="table:usPopulationProjection;range:B2-C6;series:columns; | ||
33 | legendVisible:true; | ||
34 | plotBorderVisible:false; | ||
35 | backgroundColor:FFFFFF; | ||
36 | plotBackgroundColor:F9F9F9; | ||
37 | borderColor:FFFFFF; | ||
38 | colors=4E79A7,F28E2B" | ||
39 | title="Projected U.S. Population with vs. without Immigration" | ||
40 | width="700" height="350"}} | ||
41 | {{/chart}} | ||
42 | |||
43 | == Fiscal, Political, and Social Consequences == | ||
44 | |||
45 | Immigration is no longer just a cultural phenomenon. As shown by multiple empirical studies, it carries **measurable fiscal burdens**, reshapes **voting patterns**, and introduces new demands on state institutions. | ||
46 | |||
47 | {{expandable summary="Study: Projecting the Impact of Immigration on the U.S. Population"}} | ||
48 | **Source:** *Center for Immigration Studies* | ||
49 | **Date of Publication:** *2022* | ||
50 | **Author(s):** *Steven Camarota and Karen Zeigler* | ||
51 | **Title:** *"Projecting the Impact of Immigration on the U.S. Population"* | ||
52 | **DOI:** N/A | ||
53 | **Subject Matter:** *Demographics, immigration policy, long-term growth* | ||
54 | |||
55 | {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}} | ||
56 | 1. **Total U.S. Population in 2060:** | ||
57 | - With immigration: **404 million** | ||
58 | - Without immigration: **336 million** | ||
59 | 2. **Share of Growth from Immigration (2020–2060):** **89%** | ||
60 | 3. **Projected Immigrant-Origin Share of U.S. Population (2060):** Over **30%** | ||
61 | {{/expandable}} | ||
62 | |||
63 | {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}} | ||
64 | 1. **Demographic Surge:** | ||
65 | Immigration accounts for nearly all growth beyond 2030, driven by both new arrivals and their U.S.-born descendants. | ||
66 | |||
67 | 2. **Educational and Economic Strain:** | ||
68 | Most post-1965 immigrants arrive with below-average education, increasing demand on public schools and healthcare. | ||
69 | |||
70 | 3. **Displacement and Fiscal Pressure:** | ||
71 | Native employment sectors face downward wage pressure; fiscal impact is negative or neutral for most groups. | ||
72 | |||
73 | 4. **Voting Trends:** | ||
74 | Immigration shifts the electorate leftward; this is especially pronounced in formerly competitive states like Nevada and Georgia. | ||
75 | {{/expandable}} | ||
76 | |||
77 | {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}} | ||
78 | 1. **Strengths of the Study:** | ||
79 | - Long-range population modeling | ||
80 | - Includes second-generation effects | ||
81 | - Clear quantitative comparisons with/without immigration | ||
82 | |||
83 | 2. **Limitations:** | ||
84 | - No fiscal breakdown by ethnicity | ||
85 | - Lacks cultural or cohesion metrics | ||
86 | |||
87 | 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:** | ||
88 | - Track assimilation outcomes | ||
89 | - Project infrastructure demand | ||
90 | - Compare impact by immigrant cohort | ||
91 | {{/expandable}} | ||
92 | |||
93 | {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}} | ||
94 | - Supports claims about demographic transformation post-1965 | ||
95 | - Shows immigration as the primary driver of future U.S. population growth | ||
96 | - Validates concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability | ||
97 | {{/expandable}} | ||
98 | |||
99 | {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}} | ||
100 | 1. Recreate model using state-level projections | ||
101 | 2. Include fertility and intermarriage adjustments | ||
102 | 3. Compare to EU or Canadian trends | ||
103 | {{/expandable}} | ||
104 | |||
105 | {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}} | ||
106 | [[Download Full Study>>attach:Camarota and Zeigler - Projecting the Impact of Immigration on the U.S. Population.pdf]] | ||
107 | {{/expandable}} | ||
108 | {{/expandable}} | ||
109 | |||
110 | == Related Topics == | ||
111 | * [[The Great Replacement Theory>>GreatReplacementTheory.WebHome]] | ||
112 | * [[Demographic Engineering in Europe>>Europe.DemographicEngineering]] | ||
113 | * [[Race and Citizenship>>Race.Citizenship]] | ||
114 | |||
115 | == Footnotes == | ||
116 | {{footnote}}Camarota, Steven A., and Karen Zeigler. *Projecting the Impact of Immigration on the U.S. Population*, Center for Immigration Studies (2022). Available at: [[https://cis.org/Report/Projecting-Impact-Immigration-US-Population]]{{/footnote}} | ||
117 | |||
118 | {{footnote}}Naturalization Act of 1790, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., Ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103{{/footnote}} | ||
119 | |||
120 | {{footnote}}Hart-Celler Act, Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub.L. 89–236{{/footnote}} | ||
121 | |||
122 | |||
123 | |||
124 | = Immigration and the Fiscal Burden on the Dutch Welfare State = | ||
125 | |||
126 | The 2023 report //Borderless Welfare State// presents a comprehensive analysis of immigration's impact on Dutch public finances. Between 1995 and 2019, immigration—including the second generation—incurred a net fiscal cost of approximately €400 billion. Projections indicate that, if current patterns continue, this figure could exceed €1 trillion by 2040. | ||
127 | |||
128 | This cost arises from increased per capita spending on education, healthcare, social security, and justice services for immigrants, combined with lower average tax contributions. In 2016 alone, the net fiscal cost of immigration peaked at €32 billion. | ||
129 | |||
130 | {{expandable summary="Study: Borderless Welfare State – The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the Netherlands"}} | ||
131 | **Source:** *Demo-Demo Publisher (Netherlands)* | ||
132 | **Date of Publication:** *2023* | ||
133 | **Author(s):** *Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog, Gerrit Kreffer* | ||
134 | **Title:** *"Borderless Welfare State: Immigration and the Sustainability of Dutch Public Finances"* | ||
135 | **DOI:** N/A | ||
136 | **Subject Matter:** *Immigration policy, fiscal sustainability, welfare state, demographic projections* | ||
137 | |||
138 | {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}} | ||
139 | 1. **Total Net Cost (1995–2019):** €400 billion | ||
140 | 2. **Projected Cost by 2040:** Exceeds €1 trillion if trends continue | ||
141 | 3. **Annual Fiscal Cost in 2016:** €32 billion | ||
142 | 4. **Second Generation Still Net Negative:** Despite education improvements | ||
143 | 5. **Cito Score Correlation:** +€20,000 per 1-point increase | ||
144 | {{/expandable}} | ||
145 | |||
146 | {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}} | ||
147 | 1. **By Immigration Motive:** | ||
148 | |||
149 | Only labour migration yields positive fiscal returns. Other categories—study, family, asylum—are net burdens. | ||
150 | |||
151 | (% id="immigrationMotive" %) | ||
152 | |=Motive|=Labour|=Study|=Family|=Asylum| | ||
153 | |Estimate A|125000|-75000|-275000|-475000| | ||
154 | |Estimate B|125000|-75000|-275000|-475000| | ||
155 | |||
156 | {{chart source="xdom" type="bar3D" params="table:immigrationMotive;range:B2-E3;series:columns; | ||
157 | legendVisible:true; | ||
158 | plotBorderVisible:false; | ||
159 | backgroundColor:FFFFFF; | ||
160 | plotBackgroundColor:F9F9F9; | ||
161 | borderColor:FFFFFF; | ||
162 | colors=4E79A7,F28E2B,E15759,76B7B2" title="Fiscal Impact by Immigration Motive (3D View)" width="800" height="360"}}{{/chart}} | ||
163 | |||
164 | 2. **By Region of Origin:** | ||
165 | |||
166 | Western migrants contribute marginally, while those from Islamic and African regions are highly negative. Japan/NA/Oceania immigrants are highly positive. | ||
167 | |||
168 | (% id="immigrationRegion" %) | ||
169 | |=Region|=Western (avg.)|=Non-Western (avg.)|=Japan/NA/Oceania|=Morocco|=Horn of Africa/Sudan| | ||
170 | |Estimate A|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| | ||
171 | |Estimate B|25000|-275000|200000|-550000|-600000| | ||
172 | |||
173 | {{chart source="xdom" type="bar3D" params="table:immigrationRegion;range:B2-F3;series:columns; | ||
174 | legendVisible:true; | ||
175 | plotBorderVisible:false; | ||
176 | backgroundColor:FFFFFF; | ||
177 | plotBackgroundColor:F9F9F9; | ||
178 | borderColor:FFFFFF; | ||
179 | colors=4E79A7,F28E2B,E15759,76B7B2,59A14F" title="Fiscal Impact by Region of Origin (3D View)" width="800" height="360"}}{{/chart}} | ||
180 | |||
181 | 3. **Demographic Pressure:** | ||
182 | |||
183 | Maintaining current dependency ratio would require a population of 100 million by 2100. | ||
184 | {{/expandable}} | ||
185 | |||
186 | {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}} | ||
187 | 1. **Strengths of the Study:** | ||
188 | - Includes second-generation effects | ||
189 | - Clear cost modeling by motive & origin | ||
190 | - Connects fiscal performance to educational scores | ||
191 | |||
192 | 2. **Limitations:** | ||
193 | - No cost breakdown by sector | ||
194 | - Limited modeling of non-fiscal outcomes | ||
195 | |||
196 | 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:** | ||
197 | - Disaggregate scores by family structure | ||
198 | - Add enforcement cost modeling | ||
199 | - Compare against control group baselines | ||
200 | {{/expandable}} | ||
201 | |||
202 | {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}} | ||
203 | - Demonstrates the structural fiscal unsustainability of mass immigration | ||
204 | - Highlights the value of selective, skilled migration with native integration | ||
205 | - Useful for countering myths about second-generation economic assimilation | ||
206 | {{/expandable}} | ||
207 | |||
208 | {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}} | ||
209 | 1. Compare these fiscal trends to France and Sweden | ||
210 | 2. Estimate cultural cohesion loss alongside fiscal cost | ||
211 | 3. Track welfare dependence by cohort length and generation | ||
212 | {{/expandable}} | ||
213 | |||
214 | {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}} | ||
215 | [[Download Full Study>>attach:SummaryEN.pdf]] | ||
216 | {{/expandable}} | ||
217 | {{/expandable}} |