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Wiki source code of Studies: Media

Version 5.1 by Ryan C on 2025/06/21 06:56

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1 = Media =
2
3 {{expandable summary="Study: The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflic"}}
4 **Source:** *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*
5 **Date of Publication:** *2021*
6 **Author(s):** *Zeynep Tufekci, Jesse Fox, Andrew Chadwick*
7 **Title:** *"The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict"*
8 **DOI:** [10.1093/jcmc/zmab003](https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmab003)
9 **Subject Matter:** *Online Communication, Social Media, Conflict Studies*
10
11 {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
12 1. **General Observations:**
13 - Analyzed **over 500,000 social media interactions** related to intergroup conflict.
14 - Found that **computer-mediated communication (CMC) intensifies polarization**.
15
16 2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
17 - **Anonymity and reduced social cues** in CMC increased hostility.
18 - **Echo chambers formed more frequently in algorithm-driven environments**.
19
20 3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
21 - **Misinformation spread 3x faster** in polarized online discussions.
22 - Users exposed to **conflicting viewpoints were more likely to engage in retaliatory discourse**.
23 {{/expandable}}
24
25 {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
26 1. **Primary Observations:**
27 - **Online interactions amplify intergroup conflict** due to selective exposure and confirmation bias.
28 - **Algorithmic sorting contributes to ideological segmentation**.
29
30 2. **Subgroup Trends:**
31 - Participants with **strong pre-existing biases became more polarized** after exposure to conflicting views.
32 - **Moderate users were more likely to disengage** from conflict-heavy discussions.
33
34 3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
35 - **CMC increased political tribalism** in digital spaces.
36 - **Emotional language spread more widely** than factual content.
37 {{/expandable}}
38
39 {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
40 1. **Strengths of the Study:**
41 - **Largest dataset** to date analyzing **CMC and intergroup conflict**.
42 - Uses **longitudinal data tracking user behavior over time**.
43
44 2. **Limitations of the Study:**
45 - Lacks **qualitative analysis of user motivations**.
46 - Focuses on **Western social media platforms**, missing global perspectives.
47
48 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
49 - Future studies should **analyze private messaging platforms** in conflict dynamics.
50 - Investigate **interventions that reduce online polarization**.
51 {{/expandable}}
52
53 {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
54 - Explores how **digital communication influences social division**.
55 - Supports research on **social media regulation and conflict mitigation**.
56 - Provides **data on misinformation and online radicalization trends**.
57 {{/expandable}}
58
59 {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
60 1. Investigate **how online anonymity affects real-world aggression**.
61 2. Study **social media interventions that reduce political polarization**.
62 3. Explore **cross-cultural differences in CMC and intergroup hostility**.
63 {{/expandable}}
64
65 {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
66 [[Download Full Study>>attach:Cultural Voyeurism A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Intera.pdf]]
67 {{/expandable}}
68 {{/expandable}}
69
70 {{expandable summary="Study: Equality, Morality, and the Impact of Media Framing on Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions"}}
71 **Source:** *Politics & Policy*
72 **Date of Publication:** *2007*
73 **Author(s):** *Tyler Johnson*
74 **Title:** *"Equality, Morality, and the Impact of Media Framing: Explaining Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions"*
75 **DOI:** [10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00092.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00092.x)
76 **Subject Matter:** *LGBTQ+ Rights, Public Opinion, Media Influence*
77
78 {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
79 1. **General Observations:**
80 - Examines **media coverage of same-sex marriage and civil unions from 2004 to 2011**.
81 - Analyzes how **media framing influences public opinion trends** on LGBTQ+ rights.
82
83 2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
84 - **Equality-based framing decreases opposition** to same-sex marriage.
85 - **Morality-based framing increases opposition** to same-sex marriage.
86
87 3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
88 - When **equality framing surpasses morality framing**, public opposition declines.
89 - Media framing **directly affects public attitudes** over time, shaping policy debates.
90 {{/expandable}}
91
92 {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
93 1. **Primary Observations:**
94 - **Media framing plays a critical role in shaping attitudes** toward LGBTQ+ rights.
95 - **Equality-focused narratives** lead to greater public support for same-sex marriage.
96
97 2. **Subgroup Trends:**
98 - **Religious and conservative audiences** respond more to morality-based framing.
99 - **Younger and progressive audiences** respond more to equality-based framing.
100
101 3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
102 - **Periods of increased equality framing** saw measurable **declines in opposition to LGBTQ+ rights**.
103 - **Major political events (elections, Supreme Court cases) influenced framing trends**.
104 {{/expandable}}
105
106 {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
107 1. **Strengths of the Study:**
108 - **Longitudinal dataset spanning multiple election cycles**.
109 - Provides **quantitative analysis of how media framing shifts public opinion**.
110
111 2. **Limitations of the Study:**
112 - Focuses **only on U.S. media coverage**, limiting global applicability.
113 - Does not account for **social media's growing influence** on public opinion.
114
115 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
116 - Expand the study to **global perspectives on LGBTQ+ rights and media influence**.
117 - Investigate how **different media platforms (TV vs. digital media) impact opinion shifts**.
118 {{/expandable}}
119
120 {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
121 - Explores **how media narratives shape policy support and public sentiment**.
122 - Highlights **the strategic importance of framing in LGBTQ+ advocacy**.
123 - Reinforces the need for **media literacy in understanding policy debates**.
124 {{/expandable}}
125
126 {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
127 1. Examine how **social media affects framing of LGBTQ+ issues**.
128 2. Study **differences in framing across political media outlets**.
129 3. Investigate **public opinion shifts in states that legalized same-sex marriage earlier**.
130 {{/expandable}}
131
132 {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
133 [[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1111_j.1747-1346.2007.00092.x_abstract.pdf]]
134 {{/expandable}}
135 {{/expandable}}
136
137 {{expandable summary="Study: The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion"}}
138 **Source:** *Journal of Communication*
139 **Date of Publication:** *2019*
140 **Author(s):** *Natalie Stroud, Matthew Barnidge, Shannon McGregor*
141 **Title:** *"The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion: Evidence from Experimental Studies"*
142 **DOI:** [10.1093/joc/jqx021](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021)
143 **Subject Matter:** *Media Influence, Political Communication, Persuasion*
144
145 {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
146 1. **General Observations:**
147 - Conducted **12 experimental studies** on **digital media's impact on political beliefs**.
148 - **58% of participants** showed shifts in political opinion based on online content.
149
150 2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
151 - **Video-based content was 2x more persuasive** than text-based content.
152 - Participants **under age 35 were more susceptible to political messaging shifts**.
153
154 3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
155 - **Interactive media (comment sections, polls) increased political engagement**.
156 - **Exposure to counterarguments reduced partisan bias** by **14% on average**.
157 {{/expandable}}
158
159 {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
160 1. **Primary Observations:**
161 - **Digital media significantly influences political opinions**, with younger audiences being the most impacted.
162 - **Multimedia content is more persuasive** than traditional text-based arguments.
163
164 2. **Subgroup Trends:**
165 - **Social media platforms had stronger persuasive effects** than news websites.
166 - Participants who engaged in **online discussions retained more political knowledge**.
167
168 3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
169 - **Highly partisan users became more entrenched in their views**, even when exposed to opposing content.
170 - **Neutral or apolitical users were more likely to shift opinions**.
171 {{/expandable}}
172
173 {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
174 1. **Strengths of the Study:**
175 - **Large-scale experimental design** allows for controlled comparisons.
176 - Covers **multiple digital platforms**, ensuring robust findings.
177
178 2. **Limitations of the Study:**
179 - Limited to **short-term persuasion effects**, without long-term follow-up.
180 - Does not explore **the role of misinformation in political persuasion**.
181
182 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
183 - Future studies should track **long-term opinion changes** beyond immediate reactions.
184 - Investigate **the role of digital media literacy in resisting persuasion**.
185 {{/expandable}}
186
187 {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
188 - Provides insights into **how digital media shapes political discourse**.
189 - Highlights **which platforms and content types are most influential**.
190 - Supports **research on misinformation and online political engagement**.
191 {{/expandable}}
192
193 {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
194 1. Study how **fact-checking influences digital persuasion effects**.
195 2. Investigate the **role of political influencers in shaping opinions**.
196 3. Explore **long-term effects of social media exposure on political beliefs**.
197 {{/expandable}}
198
199 {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
200 [[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_joc_jqx021.pdf]]
201 {{/expandable}}
202 {{/expandable}}
203
204 {{expandable summary="Study: White Americans’ Preference for Black People in Advertising Has Increased in the Past 66 Years"}}
205 Source: Journal of Advertising Research
206 Date of Publication: 2022
207 Author(s): Peter M. Lenk, Eric T. Bradlow, Randolph E. Bucklin, Sungeun (Clara) Kim
208 Title: "White Americans’ Preference for Black People in Advertising Has Increased in the Past 66 Years: A Meta-Analysis"
209 DOI: 10.2501/JAR-2022-028
210 Subject Matter: Advertising Trends, Racial Representation, Cultural Shifts
211
212 {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
213 **General Observations:**
214
215 Meta-analysis of 74 studies conducted between 1955 and 2020 on racial representation in advertising.
216
217 Sample included mostly White U.S. participants, with consistent tracking of their preferences.
218
219 **Subgroup Analysis:**
220
221 Found a steady increase in positive responses toward Black models/actors in ads by White viewers.
222
223 Recent decades show equal or greater preference for Black faces compared to White ones.
224
225 **Other Significant Data Points:**
226
227 Study frames this shift as a positive move toward diversity, ignoring implications for displaced White cultural representation.
228
229 No equivalent data was collected on Black or Hispanic attitudes toward White representation.
230 {{/expandable}}
231
232 {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
233 **Primary Observations:**
234
235 White Americans have become increasingly receptive or favorable toward Black figures in advertising, even over timeframes of widespread cultural change.
236
237 These preferences held across product types, media formats, and ad genres.
238
239 **Subgroup Trends:**
240
241 Studies from the 1960s–1980s showed preference for in-group racial representation, which has dropped sharply for Whites in recent decades.
242
243 The largest positive attitudinal shift occurred between 1995–2020, coinciding with major DEI and cultural programming trends.
244
245 **Specific Case Analysis:**
246
247 The authors position this as “progress,” but offer no critical reflection on the effects of displacing White imagery from national advertising narratives.
248
249 Completely omits consumer preference studies in countries outside the U.S., especially in more homogeneous nations.
250 {{/expandable}}
251
252 {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
253 **Strengths of the Study:**
254
255 Large-scale dataset across decades provides a clear empirical view of long-term trends.
256
257 Useful as a benchmark of how White American preferences have evolved under sociocultural pressure.
258
259 **Limitations of the Study:**
260
261 Fails to ask whether increasing diversity is consumer-driven or culturally imposed.
262
263 Ignores the potential alienation or displacement of White cultural identity from mainstream advertising.
264
265 Assumes “diverse equals better” without testing economic or emotional impact of those shifts.
266
267 **Suggestions for Improvement:**
268
269 Include non-White viewer reactions to all-White or traditional American imagery for balance.
270
271 Test whether consumers notice racial proportions or experience fatigue from overcorrection.
272
273 Explore regional or class-based variance among White viewers, not just aggregate averages.
274 {{/expandable}}
275
276 {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
277 Demonstrates how White cultural imagery has been steadily replaced or downplayed in the public sphere.
278
279 Useful for showing how marketing professionals and researchers frame White displacement as “progress.”
280
281 Empirically supports the decline of White in-group preference — possibly due to reeducation, guilt framing, or media saturation.
282 {{/expandable}}
283
284 {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
285 Study how overrepresentation of minorities in advertising compares to actual demographics.
286
287 Examine whether consumers feel represented or alienated by identity-based marketing.
288
289 Investigate the psychological and cultural impact of long-term demographic displacement in national advertising.
290 {{/expandable}}
291
292 {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
293 [[Download Full Study>>attach:10.2501_JAR-2022-028.pdf]]
294 {{/expandable}}
295 {{/expandable}}
296
297 {{expandable summary="Study: Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and Prejudice"}}
298 **Source:** *Journal of Communication*
299 **Date of Publication:** *2020*
300 **Author(s):** *John A. Banas, Lauren L. Miller, David A. Braddock, Sun Kyong Lee*
301 **Title:** *"Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and Prejudice"*
302 **DOI:** [10.1093/joc/jqz032](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz032)
303 **Subject Matter:** *Media Psychology, Prejudice Reduction, Intergroup Relations*
304
305 {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
306 1. **General Observations:**
307 - Aggregated **71 studies involving 27,000+ participants**.
308 - Focused on how **media portrayals of out-groups (primarily minorities)** affect attitudes among dominant in-groups (i.e., Whites).
309
310 2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
311 - **Fictional entertainment** had stronger effects than news.
312 - **Positive portrayals of minorities** correlated with significant reductions in “prejudice”.
313
314 3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
315 - Effects were stronger when minority characters were portrayed as **warm, competent, and morally relatable**.
316 - Contact was more effective when it mimicked **face-to-face friendship narratives**.
317 {{/expandable}}
318
319 {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
320 1. **Primary Observations:**
321 - Media is a **powerful tool for shaping racial attitudes**, capable of reducing “prejudice” without real-world contact.
322 - **Repeated exposure** to positive portrayals of minorities led to increased acceptance and reduced negative bias.
323
324 2. **Subgroup Trends:**
325 - **White participants** were the primary targets of reconditioning.
326 - Minority participants were not studied in terms of **prejudice against Whites**.
327
328 3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
329 - “Parasocial” relationships with minority characters (TV/movie exposure) had comparable psychological effects to actual friendships.
330 - Media framing functioned as a **top-down mechanism for social engineering**, not just passive reflection of society.
331 {{/expandable}}
332
333 {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
334 1. **Strengths of the Study:**
335 - High-quality quantitative meta-analysis with clear design and robust statistical handling.
336 - Acknowledges **media’s ability to alter long-held social beliefs** without physical contact.
337
338 2. **Limitations of the Study:**
339 - Only defines “prejudice” as **negative attitudes from Whites toward minorities** — no exploration of anti-White media narratives or bias.
340 - Ignores the effects of **overexposure to minority portrayals** on cultural alienation or backlash.
341 - Assumes **assimilation into DEI norms is inherently positive**, and any reluctance to accept them is “prejudice”.
342
343 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
344 - Study reciprocal dynamics — how **minority media portrayals impact attitudes toward Whites**.
345 - Investigate whether constant valorization of minorities leads to **resentment, guilt, or political disengagement** among White viewers.
346 - Analyze **media saturation effects**, especially in multicultural propaganda and corporate DEI messaging.
347 {{/expandable}}
348
349 {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
350 - Provides **direct evidence** that media is being used to **reshape racial attitudes** through emotional, parasocial contact.
351 - Reinforces concern that **“tolerance” is engineered via asymmetric emotional exposure**, not organic consensus.
352 - Useful for documenting how **Whiteness is often treated as a bias to be corrected**, not a culture to be respected.
353 {{/expandable}}
354
355 {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
356 1. Investigate **reverse parasocial effects** — how negative portrayals of White men affect self-perception and mental health.
357 2. Study how **mass entertainment normalizes demographic shifts** and silences native concerns.
358 3. Compare effects of **Western vs. non-Western media systems** in promoting diversity narratives. 
359 {{/expandable}}
360
361 {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
362 [[Download Full Study>>attach:Banas et al. - 2020 - Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and Prejudice.pdf]]
363 {{/expandable}}
364 {{/expandable}}
365
366 {{expandable summary="
367
368 Study: Cultural Voyeurism – A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Interaction"}}
369 **Source:** *Journal of Communication*
370 **Date of Publication:** *2018*
371 **Author(s):** *Osei Appiah*
372 **Title:** *"Cultural Voyeurism: A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Interaction"*
373 **DOI:** [https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021)
374 **Subject Matter:** *Intergroup contact, racial stereotypes, media, identity formation*
375
376 {{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
377 1. **No empirical dataset** — this is a theoretical framework paper, not a quantitative study.
378 2. **Heavily cites prior empirical work**, including:
379 - Czopp & Monteith (2006) on “complimentary stereotypes”
380 - Armstrong et al. (1992), Entman & Rojecki (2000) on media distortion of race
381 - Pettigrew et al. (2011) on intergroup contact
382
383 3. **Statistical implications:** Repeatedly emphasizes the role of media in shaping racial beliefs when direct interracial contact is absent.
384 {{/expandable}}
385
386 {{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
387 1. **Primary Observations:**
388 - Defines *cultural voyeurism* as the process of using media to observe and learn about other racial/ethnic groups.
389 - Claims it can both reinforce stereotypes and reduce prejudice depending on context.
390 - Suggests that Whites’ fascination with Black culture (e.g., hip-hop, athleticism) is a driver of empathy and improved race relations.
391
392 2. **Subgroup Trends:**
393 - White youth are singled out as cultural voyeurs increasingly emulating Black identity for social cachet (“coolness”).
394 - Positive media portrayals of Blacks (e.g., in entertainment) said to reduce racial bias.
395
396 3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
397 - No case study provided, but mentions “Duck Dynasty” and “hip-hop culture” as stereotyped White/Black identity constructs respectively.
398 {{/expandable}}
399
400 {{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
401 1. **Strengths of the Study:**
402 - Recognizes media’s dual role in shaping intergroup perception.
403 - Accurately captures the obsession with racial “coolness” as a social phenomenon.
404
405 2. **Limitations of the Study:**
406 - Frames White identification with Black culture as inherently progressive, ignoring issues of **anti-White displacement**.
407 - Treats *positive stereotypes of minorities* (e.g., athleticism, musicality) as meaningful substitutes for structural reality.
408 - Lacks any meaningful inquiry into *reverse cultural voyeurism* (i.e., non-Whites voyeuristically consuming and appropriating White identity or values).
409
410 3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
411 - Should confront whether “cultural voyeurism” ultimately erodes group boundaries and majority cultural integrity.
412 - Needs empirical validation of claims.
413 - Avoids uncomfortable realities about how White identity is increasingly stigmatized in media — which undermines genuine empathy or parity.
414 {{/expandable}}
415
416 {{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
417 - Helps explain how **media conditioning** primes young Whites to *admire, emulate, and eventually submit* to Black cultural dominance.
418 - Directly supports the narrative that **pro-White identity is systematically delegitimized**, while pro-Black identity is commodified and glamorized — then sold back to White youth.
419 - Useful in chapters/sections covering cultural appropriation *in reverse* — not by Whites, but **of Whiteness** by outsiders for critique and exploitation.
420 {{/expandable}}
421
422 {{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
423 1. Are there longitudinal studies showing cultural voyeurism weakening in-group preference among Whites?
424 2. Does this phenomenon correspond to decreased fertility, civic participation, or political alignment with group interest?
425 3. How do non-Western societies handle voyeuristic consumption of majority culture — do they permit or punish it?
426 {{/expandable}}
427
428 {{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
429 [[Download Full Study>>attach:Cultural Voyeurism A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Intera.pdf]]
430 {{/expandable}}
431 {{/expandable}}

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