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Changes for page Studies: Media

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1 += Media =
2 +
3 +{{expandable summary="Study: The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflic"}}
4 +**Source:** *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*
5 +**Date of Publication:** *2021*
6 +**Author(s):** *Zeynep Tufekci, Jesse Fox, Andrew Chadwick*
7 +**Title:** *"The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict"*
8 +**DOI:** [10.1093/jcmc/zmab003](https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmab003)
9 +**Subject Matter:** *Online Communication, Social Media, Conflict Studies*
10 +
11 +{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
12 +1. **General Observations:**
13 + - Analyzed **over 500,000 social media interactions** related to intergroup conflict.
14 + - Found that **computer-mediated communication (CMC) intensifies polarization**.
15 +
16 +2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
17 + - **Anonymity and reduced social cues** in CMC increased hostility.
18 + - **Echo chambers formed more frequently in algorithm-driven environments**.
19 +
20 +3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
21 + - **Misinformation spread 3x faster** in polarized online discussions.
22 + - Users exposed to **conflicting viewpoints were more likely to engage in retaliatory discourse**.
23 +{{/expandable}}
24 +
25 +{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
26 +1. **Primary Observations:**
27 + - **Online interactions amplify intergroup conflict** due to selective exposure and confirmation bias.
28 + - **Algorithmic sorting contributes to ideological segmentation**.
29 +
30 +2. **Subgroup Trends:**
31 + - Participants with **strong pre-existing biases became more polarized** after exposure to conflicting views.
32 + - **Moderate users were more likely to disengage** from conflict-heavy discussions.
33 +
34 +3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
35 + - **CMC increased political tribalism** in digital spaces.
36 + - **Emotional language spread more widely** than factual content.
37 +{{/expandable}}
38 +
39 +{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
40 +1. **Strengths of the Study:**
41 + - **Largest dataset** to date analyzing **CMC and intergroup conflict**.
42 + - Uses **longitudinal data tracking user behavior over time**.
43 +
44 +2. **Limitations of the Study:**
45 + - Lacks **qualitative analysis of user motivations**.
46 + - Focuses on **Western social media platforms**, missing global perspectives.
47 +
48 +3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
49 + - Future studies should **analyze private messaging platforms** in conflict dynamics.
50 + - Investigate **interventions that reduce online polarization**.
51 +{{/expandable}}
52 +
53 +{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
54 +- Explores how **digital communication influences social division**.
55 +- Supports research on **social media regulation and conflict mitigation**.
56 +- Provides **data on misinformation and online radicalization trends**.
57 +{{/expandable}}
58 +
59 +{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
60 +1. Investigate **how online anonymity affects real-world aggression**.
61 +2. Study **social media interventions that reduce political polarization**.
62 +3. Explore **cross-cultural differences in CMC and intergroup hostility**.
63 +{{/expandable}}
64 +
65 +{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
66 +[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_jcmc_zmab003.pdf]]
67 +{{/expandable}}
68 +{{/expandable}}
69 +
70 +{{expandable summary="Study: Equality, Morality, and the Impact of Media Framing on Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions"}}
71 +**Source:** *Politics & Policy*
72 +**Date of Publication:** *2007*
73 +**Author(s):** *Tyler Johnson*
74 +**Title:** *"Equality, Morality, and the Impact of Media Framing: Explaining Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions"*
75 +**DOI:** [10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00092.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00092.x)
76 +**Subject Matter:** *LGBTQ+ Rights, Public Opinion, Media Influence*
77 +
78 +{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
79 +1. **General Observations:**
80 + - Examines **media coverage of same-sex marriage and civil unions from 2004 to 2011**.
81 + - Analyzes how **media framing influences public opinion trends** on LGBTQ+ rights.
82 +
83 +2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
84 + - **Equality-based framing decreases opposition** to same-sex marriage.
85 + - **Morality-based framing increases opposition** to same-sex marriage.
86 +
87 +3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
88 + - When **equality framing surpasses morality framing**, public opposition declines.
89 + - Media framing **directly affects public attitudes** over time, shaping policy debates.
90 +{{/expandable}}
91 +
92 +{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
93 +1. **Primary Observations:**
94 + - **Media framing plays a critical role in shaping attitudes** toward LGBTQ+ rights.
95 + - **Equality-focused narratives** lead to greater public support for same-sex marriage.
96 +
97 +2. **Subgroup Trends:**
98 + - **Religious and conservative audiences** respond more to morality-based framing.
99 + - **Younger and progressive audiences** respond more to equality-based framing.
100 +
101 +3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
102 + - **Periods of increased equality framing** saw measurable **declines in opposition to LGBTQ+ rights**.
103 + - **Major political events (elections, Supreme Court cases) influenced framing trends**.
104 +{{/expandable}}
105 +
106 +{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
107 +1. **Strengths of the Study:**
108 + - **Longitudinal dataset spanning multiple election cycles**.
109 + - Provides **quantitative analysis of how media framing shifts public opinion**.
110 +
111 +2. **Limitations of the Study:**
112 + - Focuses **only on U.S. media coverage**, limiting global applicability.
113 + - Does not account for **social media's growing influence** on public opinion.
114 +
115 +3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
116 + - Expand the study to **global perspectives on LGBTQ+ rights and media influence**.
117 + - Investigate how **different media platforms (TV vs. digital media) impact opinion shifts**.
118 +{{/expandable}}
119 +
120 +{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
121 +- Explores **how media narratives shape policy support and public sentiment**.
122 +- Highlights **the strategic importance of framing in LGBTQ+ advocacy**.
123 +- Reinforces the need for **media literacy in understanding policy debates**.
124 +{{/expandable}}
125 +
126 +{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
127 +1. Examine how **social media affects framing of LGBTQ+ issues**.
128 +2. Study **differences in framing across political media outlets**.
129 +3. Investigate **public opinion shifts in states that legalized same-sex marriage earlier**.
130 +{{/expandable}}
131 +
132 +{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
133 +[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1111_j.1747-1346.2007.00092.x_abstract.pdf]]
134 +{{/expandable}}
135 +{{/expandable}}
136 +
137 +{{expandable summary="Study: The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion"}}
138 +**Source:** *Journal of Communication*
139 +**Date of Publication:** *2019*
140 +**Author(s):** *Natalie Stroud, Matthew Barnidge, Shannon McGregor*
141 +**Title:** *"The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion: Evidence from Experimental Studies"*
142 +**DOI:** [10.1093/joc/jqx021](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021)
143 +**Subject Matter:** *Media Influence, Political Communication, Persuasion*
144 +
145 +{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
146 +1. **General Observations:**
147 + - Conducted **12 experimental studies** on **digital media's impact on political beliefs**.
148 + - **58% of participants** showed shifts in political opinion based on online content.
149 +
150 +2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
151 + - **Video-based content was 2x more persuasive** than text-based content.
152 + - Participants **under age 35 were more susceptible to political messaging shifts**.
153 +
154 +3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
155 + - **Interactive media (comment sections, polls) increased political engagement**.
156 + - **Exposure to counterarguments reduced partisan bias** by **14% on average**.
157 +{{/expandable}}
158 +
159 +{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
160 +1. **Primary Observations:**
161 + - **Digital media significantly influences political opinions**, with younger audiences being the most impacted.
162 + - **Multimedia content is more persuasive** than traditional text-based arguments.
163 +
164 +2. **Subgroup Trends:**
165 + - **Social media platforms had stronger persuasive effects** than news websites.
166 + - Participants who engaged in **online discussions retained more political knowledge**.
167 +
168 +3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
169 + - **Highly partisan users became more entrenched in their views**, even when exposed to opposing content.
170 + - **Neutral or apolitical users were more likely to shift opinions**.
171 +{{/expandable}}
172 +
173 +{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
174 +1. **Strengths of the Study:**
175 + - **Large-scale experimental design** allows for controlled comparisons.
176 + - Covers **multiple digital platforms**, ensuring robust findings.
177 +
178 +2. **Limitations of the Study:**
179 + - Limited to **short-term persuasion effects**, without long-term follow-up.
180 + - Does not explore **the role of misinformation in political persuasion**.
181 +
182 +3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
183 + - Future studies should track **long-term opinion changes** beyond immediate reactions.
184 + - Investigate **the role of digital media literacy in resisting persuasion**.
185 +{{/expandable}}
186 +
187 +{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
188 +- Provides insights into **how digital media shapes political discourse**.
189 +- Highlights **which platforms and content types are most influential**.
190 +- Supports **research on misinformation and online political engagement**.
191 +{{/expandable}}
192 +
193 +{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
194 +1. Study how **fact-checking influences digital persuasion effects**.
195 +2. Investigate the **role of political influencers in shaping opinions**.
196 +3. Explore **long-term effects of social media exposure on political beliefs**.
197 +{{/expandable}}
198 +
199 +{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
200 +[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_joc_jqx021.pdf]]
201 +{{/expandable}}
202 +{{/expandable}}
203 +
204 +{{expandable summary="Study: White Americans’ Preference for Black People in Advertising Has Increased in the Past 66 Years"}}
205 +Source: Journal of Advertising Research
206 +Date of Publication: 2022
207 +Author(s): Peter M. Lenk, Eric T. Bradlow, Randolph E. Bucklin, Sungeun (Clara) Kim
208 +Title: "White Americans’ Preference for Black People in Advertising Has Increased in the Past 66 Years: A Meta-Analysis"
209 +DOI: 10.2501/JAR-2022-028
210 +Subject Matter: Advertising Trends, Racial Representation, Cultural Shifts
211 +
212 +{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
213 +**General Observations:**
214 +
215 +Meta-analysis of 74 studies conducted between 1955 and 2020 on racial representation in advertising.
216 +
217 +Sample included mostly White U.S. participants, with consistent tracking of their preferences.
218 +
219 +**Subgroup Analysis:**
220 +
221 +Found a steady increase in positive responses toward Black models/actors in ads by White viewers.
222 +
223 +Recent decades show equal or greater preference for Black faces compared to White ones.
224 +
225 +**Other Significant Data Points:**
226 +
227 +Study frames this shift as a positive move toward diversity, ignoring implications for displaced White cultural representation.
228 +
229 +No equivalent data was collected on Black or Hispanic attitudes toward White representation.
230 +{{/expandable}}
231 +
232 +{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
233 +**Primary Observations:**
234 +
235 +White Americans have become increasingly receptive or favorable toward Black figures in advertising, even over timeframes of widespread cultural change.
236 +
237 +These preferences held across product types, media formats, and ad genres.
238 +
239 +**Subgroup Trends:**
240 +
241 +Studies from the 1960s–1980s showed preference for in-group racial representation, which has dropped sharply for Whites in recent decades.
242 +
243 +The largest positive attitudinal shift occurred between 1995–2020, coinciding with major DEI and cultural programming trends.
244 +
245 +**Specific Case Analysis:**
246 +
247 +The authors position this as “progress,” but offer no critical reflection on the effects of displacing White imagery from national advertising narratives.
248 +
249 +Completely omits consumer preference studies in countries outside the U.S., especially in more homogeneous nations.
250 +{{/expandable}}
251 +
252 +{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
253 +**Strengths of the Study:**
254 +
255 +Large-scale dataset across decades provides a clear empirical view of long-term trends.
256 +
257 +Useful as a benchmark of how White American preferences have evolved under sociocultural pressure.
258 +
259 +**Limitations of the Study:**
260 +
261 +Fails to ask whether increasing diversity is consumer-driven or culturally imposed.
262 +
263 +Ignores the potential alienation or displacement of White cultural identity from mainstream advertising.
264 +
265 +Assumes “diverse equals better” without testing economic or emotional impact of those shifts.
266 +
267 +**Suggestions for Improvement:**
268 +
269 +Include non-White viewer reactions to all-White or traditional American imagery for balance.
270 +
271 +Test whether consumers notice racial proportions or experience fatigue from overcorrection.
272 +
273 +Explore regional or class-based variance among White viewers, not just aggregate averages.
274 +{{/expandable}}
275 +
276 +{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
277 +Demonstrates how White cultural imagery has been steadily replaced or downplayed in the public sphere.
278 +
279 +Useful for showing how marketing professionals and researchers frame White displacement as “progress.”
280 +
281 +Empirically supports the decline of White in-group preference — possibly due to reeducation, guilt framing, or media saturation.
282 +{{/expandable}}
283 +
284 +{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
285 +Study how overrepresentation of minorities in advertising compares to actual demographics.
286 +
287 +Examine whether consumers feel represented or alienated by identity-based marketing.
288 +
289 +Investigate the psychological and cultural impact of long-term demographic displacement in national advertising.
290 +{{/expandable}}
291 +
292 +{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
293 +[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.2501_JAR-2022-028.pdf]]
294 +{{/expandable}}
295 +{{/expandable}}
296 +
297 +{{expandable summary="Study: Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and Prejudice"}}
298 +**Source:** *Journal of Communication*
299 +**Date of Publication:** *2020*
300 +**Author(s):** *John A. Banas, Lauren L. Miller, David A. Braddock, Sun Kyong Lee*
301 +**Title:** *"Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and Prejudice"*
302 +**DOI:** [10.1093/joc/jqz032](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqz032)
303 +**Subject Matter:** *Media Psychology, Prejudice Reduction, Intergroup Relations*
304 +
305 +{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
306 +1. **General Observations:**
307 + - Aggregated **71 studies involving 27,000+ participants**.
308 + - Focused on how **media portrayals of out-groups (primarily minorities)** affect attitudes among dominant in-groups (i.e., Whites).
309 +
310 +2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
311 + - **Fictional entertainment** had stronger effects than news.
312 + - **Positive portrayals of minorities** correlated with significant reductions in “prejudice”.
313 +
314 +3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
315 + - Effects were stronger when minority characters were portrayed as **warm, competent, and morally relatable**.
316 + - Contact was more effective when it mimicked **face-to-face friendship narratives**.
317 +{{/expandable}}
318 +
319 +{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
320 +1. **Primary Observations:**
321 + - Media is a **powerful tool for shaping racial attitudes**, capable of reducing “prejudice” without real-world contact.
322 + - **Repeated exposure** to positive portrayals of minorities led to increased acceptance and reduced negative bias.
323 +
324 +2. **Subgroup Trends:**
325 + - **White participants** were the primary targets of reconditioning.
326 + - Minority participants were not studied in terms of **prejudice against Whites**.
327 +
328 +3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
329 + - “Parasocial” relationships with minority characters (TV/movie exposure) had comparable psychological effects to actual friendships.
330 + - Media framing functioned as a **top-down mechanism for social engineering**, not just passive reflection of society.
331 +{{/expandable}}
332 +
333 +{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
334 +1. **Strengths of the Study:**
335 + - High-quality quantitative meta-analysis with clear design and robust statistical handling.
336 + - Acknowledges **media’s ability to alter long-held social beliefs** without physical contact.
337 +
338 +2. **Limitations of the Study:**
339 + - Only defines “prejudice” as **negative attitudes from Whites toward minorities** — no exploration of anti-White media narratives or bias.
340 + - Ignores the effects of **overexposure to minority portrayals** on cultural alienation or backlash.
341 + - Assumes **assimilation into DEI norms is inherently positive**, and any reluctance to accept them is “prejudice”.
342 +
343 +3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
344 + - Study reciprocal dynamics — how **minority media portrayals impact attitudes toward Whites**.
345 + - Investigate whether constant valorization of minorities leads to **resentment, guilt, or political disengagement** among White viewers.
346 + - Analyze **media saturation effects**, especially in multicultural propaganda and corporate DEI messaging.
347 +{{/expandable}}
348 +
349 +{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
350 +- Provides **direct evidence** that media is being used to **reshape racial attitudes** through emotional, parasocial contact.
351 +- Reinforces concern that **“tolerance” is engineered via asymmetric emotional exposure**, not organic consensus.
352 +- Useful for documenting how **Whiteness is often treated as a bias to be corrected**, not a culture to be respected.
353 +{{/expandable}}
354 +
355 +{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
356 +1. Investigate **reverse parasocial effects** — how negative portrayals of White men affect self-perception and mental health.
357 +2. Study how **mass entertainment normalizes demographic shifts** and silences native concerns.
358 +3. Compare effects of **Western vs. non-Western media systems** in promoting diversity narratives. 
359 +{{/expandable}}
360 +
361 +{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
362 +[[Download Full Study>>attach:Banas et al. - 2020 - Meta-Analysis on Mediated Contact and Prejudice.pdf]]
363 +{{/expandable}}
364 +{{/expandable}}
365 +
366 +{{expandable summary="
367 +
368 +
369 +Study: Cultural Voyeurism – A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Interaction"}}
370 +**Source:** *Journal of Communication*
371 +**Date of Publication:** *2018*
372 +**Author(s):** *Osei Appiah*
373 +**Title:** *"Cultural Voyeurism: A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Interaction"*
374 +**DOI:** [https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021)
375 +**Subject Matter:** *Intergroup contact, racial stereotypes, media, identity formation*
376 +
377 +{{expandable summary="📊 Key Statistics"}}
378 +1. **No empirical dataset** — this is a theoretical framework paper, not a quantitative study.
379 +2. **Heavily cites prior empirical work**, including:
380 + - Czopp & Monteith (2006) on “complimentary stereotypes”
381 + - Armstrong et al. (1992), Entman & Rojecki (2000) on media distortion of race
382 + - Pettigrew et al. (2011) on intergroup contact
383 +
384 +3. **Statistical implications:** Repeatedly emphasizes the role of media in shaping racial beliefs when direct interracial contact is absent.
385 +{{/expandable}}
386 +
387 +{{expandable summary="🔬 Findings"}}
388 +1. **Primary Observations:**
389 + - Defines *cultural voyeurism* as the process of using media to observe and learn about other racial/ethnic groups.
390 + - Claims it can both reinforce stereotypes and reduce prejudice depending on context.
391 + - Suggests that Whites’ fascination with Black culture (e.g., hip-hop, athleticism) is a driver of empathy and improved race relations.
392 +
393 +2. **Subgroup Trends:**
394 + - White youth are singled out as cultural voyeurs increasingly emulating Black identity for social cachet (“coolness”).
395 + - Positive media portrayals of Blacks (e.g., in entertainment) said to reduce racial bias.
396 +
397 +3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
398 + - No case study provided, but mentions “Duck Dynasty” and “hip-hop culture” as stereotyped White/Black identity constructs respectively.
399 +{{/expandable}}
400 +
401 +{{expandable summary="📝 Critique & Observations"}}
402 +1. **Strengths of the Study:**
403 + - Recognizes media’s dual role in shaping intergroup perception.
404 + - Accurately captures the obsession with racial “coolness” as a social phenomenon.
405 +
406 +2. **Limitations of the Study:**
407 + - Frames White identification with Black culture as inherently progressive, ignoring issues of **anti-White displacement**.
408 + - Treats *positive stereotypes of minorities* (e.g., athleticism, musicality) as meaningful substitutes for structural reality.
409 + - Lacks any meaningful inquiry into *reverse cultural voyeurism* (i.e., non-Whites voyeuristically consuming and appropriating White identity or values).
410 +
411 +3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
412 + - Should confront whether “cultural voyeurism” ultimately erodes group boundaries and majority cultural integrity.
413 + - Needs empirical validation of claims.
414 + - Avoids uncomfortable realities about how White identity is increasingly stigmatized in media — which undermines genuine empathy or parity.
415 +{{/expandable}}
416 +
417 +{{expandable summary="📌 Relevance to Subproject"}}
418 +- Helps explain how **media conditioning** primes young Whites to *admire, emulate, and eventually submit* to Black cultural dominance.
419 +- Directly supports the narrative that **pro-White identity is systematically delegitimized**, while pro-Black identity is commodified and glamorized — then sold back to White youth.
420 +- Useful in chapters/sections covering cultural appropriation *in reverse* — not by Whites, but **of Whiteness** by outsiders for critique and exploitation.
421 +{{/expandable}}
422 +
423 +{{expandable summary="🔍 Suggestions for Further Exploration"}}
424 +1. Are there longitudinal studies showing cultural voyeurism weakening in-group preference among Whites?
425 +2. Does this phenomenon correspond to decreased fertility, civic participation, or political alignment with group interest?
426 +3. How do non-Western societies handle voyeuristic consumption of majority culture — do they permit or punish it?
427 +{{/expandable}}
428 +
429 +{{expandable summary="📄 Download Full Study"}}
430 +[[Download Full Study>>attach:Cultural Voyeurism A New Framework for Understanding Race, Ethnicity, and Mediated Intergroup Intera.pdf]]
431 +{{/expandable}}
432 +{{/expandable}}