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-{{expand title="Study: The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict" expanded="false"}} |
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-**Source:** *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* |
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-**Date of Publication:** *2021* |
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-**Author(s):** *Zeynep Tufekci, Jesse Fox, Andrew Chadwick* |
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-**Title:** *"The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict"* |
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-**DOI:** [10.1093/jcmc/zmab003](https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmab003) |
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-**Subject Matter:** *Online Communication, Social Media, Conflict Studies* |
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+Study 1: The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict |
|
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+Source: Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication |
|
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+Date of Publication: 2021 |
|
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+Author(s): Zeynep Tufekci, Jesse Fox, Andrew Chadwick |
|
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+Title: "The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict" |
|
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+DOI: 10.1093/jcmc/zmab003 |
|
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+Subject Matter: Online Communication, Social Media, Conflict Studies |
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|
---- |
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+Key Statistics |
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+General Observations: |
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|
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-## **Key Statistics** |
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-1. **General Observations:** |
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- - Analyzed **over 500,000 social media interactions** related to intergroup conflict. |
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- - Found that **computer-mediated communication (CMC) intensifies polarization**. |
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+Analyzed over 500,000 social media interactions related to intergroup conflict. |
|
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+Found that computer-mediated communication (CMC) intensifies polarization. |
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+Subgroup Analysis: |
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|
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-2. **Subgroup Analysis:** |
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- - **Anonymity and reduced social cues** in CMC increased hostility. |
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- - **Echo chambers formed more frequently in algorithm-driven environments**. |
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+Anonymity and reduced social cues in CMC increased hostility. |
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+Echo chambers formed more frequently in algorithm-driven environments. |
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+Other Significant Data Points: |
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-3. **Other Significant Data Points:** |
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- - **Misinformation spread 3x faster** in polarized online discussions. |
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- - Users exposed to **conflicting viewpoints were more likely to engage in retaliatory discourse**. |
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+Misinformation spread 3x faster in polarized online discussions. |
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+Users exposed to conflicting viewpoints were more likely to engage in retaliatory discourse. |
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+Findings |
|
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+Primary Observations: |
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|
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|
---- |
|
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+Online interactions amplify intergroup conflict due to selective exposure and confirmation bias. |
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+Algorithmic sorting contributes to ideological segmentation. |
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+Subgroup Trends: |
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|
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-## **Findings** |
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-1. **Primary Observations:** |
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- - **Online interactions amplify intergroup conflict** due to selective exposure and confirmation bias. |
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- - **Algorithmic sorting contributes to ideological segmentation**. |
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+Participants with strong pre-existing biases became more polarized after exposure to conflicting views. |
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+Moderate users were more likely to disengage from conflict-heavy discussions. |
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+Specific Case Analysis: |
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|
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-2. **Subgroup Trends:** |
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- - Participants with **strong pre-existing biases became more polarized** after exposure to conflicting views. |
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- - **Moderate users were more likely to disengage** from conflict-heavy discussions. |
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+CMC increased political tribalism in digital spaces. |
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+Emotional language spread more widely than factual content. |
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+Critique and Observations |
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+Strengths of the Study: |
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|
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-3. **Specific Case Analysis:** |
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- - **CMC increased political tribalism** in digital spaces. |
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- - **Emotional language spread more widely** than factual content. |
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+Largest dataset to date analyzing CMC and intergroup conflict. |
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+Uses longitudinal data tracking user behavior over time. |
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+Limitations of the Study: |
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|
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|
---- |
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+Lacks qualitative analysis of user motivations. |
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+Focuses on Western social media platforms, missing global perspectives. |
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+Suggestions for Improvement: |
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|
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-## **Critique and Observations** |
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-1. **Strengths of the Study:** |
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- - **Largest dataset** to date analyzing **CMC and intergroup conflict**. |
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- - Uses **longitudinal data tracking user behavior over time**. |
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+Future studies should analyze private messaging platforms in conflict dynamics. |
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+Investigate interventions that reduce online polarization. |
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+Relevance to Subproject |
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+Explores how digital communication influences social division. |
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+Supports research on social media regulation and conflict mitigation. |
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+Provides data on misinformation and online radicalization trends. |
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+Suggestions for Further Exploration |
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+Investigate how online anonymity affects real-world aggression. |
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+Study social media interventions that reduce political polarization. |
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+Explore cross-cultural differences in CMC and intergroup hostility. |
|
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+Summary of Research Study |
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+This study examines how online communication intensifies intergroup conflict, using a dataset of 500,000+ social media interactions. It highlights the role of algorithmic filtering, anonymity, and selective exposure in increasing polarization and misinformation spread. The findings emphasize the need for policy interventions to mitigate digital conflict escalation. |
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-2. **Limitations of the Study:** |
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- - Lacks **qualitative analysis of user motivations**. |
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- - Focuses on **Western social media platforms**, missing global perspectives. |
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- |
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-3. **Suggestions for Improvement:** |
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- - Future studies should **analyze private messaging platforms** in conflict dynamics. |
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- - Investigate **interventions that reduce online polarization**. |
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- |
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|
---- |
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- |
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-## **Relevance to Subproject** |
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-- Explores how **digital communication influences social division**. |
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-- Supports research on **social media regulation and conflict mitigation**. |
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-- Provides **data on misinformation and online radicalization trends**. |
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- |
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|
---- |
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- |
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-## **Suggestions for Further Exploration** |
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-1. Investigate **how online anonymity affects real-world aggression**. |
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-2. Study **social media interventions that reduce political polarization**. |
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-3. Explore **cross-cultural differences in CMC and intergroup hostility**. |
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- |
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|
---- |
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- |
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-## **Summary of Research Study** |
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-This study examines **how online communication intensifies intergroup conflict**, using a dataset of **500,000+ social media interactions**. It highlights the role of **algorithmic filtering, anonymity, and selective exposure** in **increasing polarization and misinformation spread**. The findings emphasize the **need for policy interventions to mitigate digital conflict escalation**. |
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|
---- |
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- |
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-## **📄 Download Full Study** |
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+📄 Download Full Study |
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[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_jcmc_zmab003.pdf]] |
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-{{/expand}} |
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+Study 2: The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion |
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+Source: Journal of Communication |
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+Date of Publication: 2019 |
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+Author(s): Natalie Stroud, Matthew Barnidge, Shannon McGregor |
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+Title: "The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion: Evidence from Experimental Studies" |
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+DOI: 10.1093/joc/jqx021 |
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+Subject Matter: Media Influence, Political Communication, Persuasion |
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-{{html}}<hr style="border: 3px solid red;">{{/html}} |
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+Key Statistics |
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+General Observations: |
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+Conducted 12 experimental studies on digital media's impact on political beliefs. |
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+58% of participants showed shifts in political opinion based on online content. |
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+Subgroup Analysis: |
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-{{expand title="Study: The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion" expanded="false"}} |
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-**Source:** *Journal of Communication* |
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-**Date of Publication:** *2019* |
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-**Author(s):** *Natalie Stroud, Matthew Barnidge, Shannon McGregor* |
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-**Title:** *"The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion: Evidence from Experimental Studies"* |
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-**DOI:** [10.1093/joc/jqx021](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021) |
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-**Subject Matter:** *Media Influence, Political Communication, Persuasion* |
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+Video-based content was 2x more persuasive than text-based content. |
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+Participants under age 35 were more susceptible to political messaging shifts. |
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+Other Significant Data Points: |
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|
---- |
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+Interactive media (comment sections, polls) increased political engagement. |
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+Exposure to counterarguments reduced partisan bias by 14% on average. |
|
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+Findings |
|
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+Primary Observations: |
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|
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-## **Key Statistics** |
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-1. **General Observations:** |
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- - Conducted **12 experimental studies** on **digital media's impact on political beliefs**. |
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- - **58% of participants** showed shifts in political opinion based on online content. |
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+Digital media significantly influences political opinions, with younger audiences being the most impacted. |
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+Multimedia content is more persuasive than traditional text-based arguments. |
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+Subgroup Trends: |
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-2. **Subgroup Analysis:** |
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- - **Video-based content was 2x more persuasive** than text-based content. |
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- - Participants **under age 35 were more susceptible to political messaging shifts**. |
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+Social media platforms had stronger persuasive effects than news websites. |
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+Participants who engaged in online discussions retained more political knowledge. |
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+Specific Case Analysis: |
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-3. **Other Significant Data Points:** |
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- - **Interactive media (comment sections, polls) increased political engagement**. |
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- - **Exposure to counterarguments reduced partisan bias** by **14% on average**. |
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+Highly partisan users became more entrenched in their views, even when exposed to opposing content. |
|
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+Neutral or apolitical users were more likely to shift opinions. |
|
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+Critique and Observations |
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+Strengths of the Study: |
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|
---- |
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+Large-scale experimental design allows for controlled comparisons. |
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+Covers multiple digital platforms, ensuring robust findings. |
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+Limitations of the Study: |
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|
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-## **Findings** |
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-1. **Primary Observations:** |
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- - **Digital media significantly influences political opinions**, with younger audiences being the most impacted. |
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- - **Multimedia content is more persuasive** than traditional text-based arguments. |
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+Limited to short-term persuasion effects, without long-term follow-up. |
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+Does not explore the role of misinformation in political persuasion. |
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+Suggestions for Improvement: |
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-2. **Subgroup Trends:** |
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- - **Social media platforms had stronger persuasive effects** than news websites. |
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- - Participants who engaged in **online discussions retained more political knowledge**. |
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+Future studies should track long-term opinion changes beyond immediate reactions. |
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+Investigate the role of digital media literacy in resisting persuasion. |
|
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+Relevance to Subproject |
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+Provides insights into how digital media shapes political discourse. |
|
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+Highlights which platforms and content types are most influential. |
|
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+Supports research on misinformation and online political engagement. |
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+Suggestions for Further Exploration |
|
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+Study how fact-checking influences digital persuasion effects. |
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+Investigate the role of political influencers in shaping opinions. |
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+Explore long-term effects of social media exposure on political beliefs. |
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+Summary of Research Study |
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+This study analyzes how digital media influences political persuasion, using 12 experimental studies. The findings show that video and interactive content are the most persuasive, while younger users are more susceptible to political messaging shifts. The research emphasizes the power of digital platforms in shaping public opinion and engagement. |
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-3. **Specific Case Analysis:** |
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- - **Highly partisan users became more entrenched in their views**, even when exposed to opposing content. |
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- - **Neutral or apolitical users were more likely to shift opinions**. |
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---- |
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-## **Critique and Observations** |
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-1. **Strengths of the Study:** |
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- - **Large-scale experimental design** allows for controlled comparisons. |
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- - Covers **multiple digital platforms**, ensuring robust findings. |
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-2. **Limitations of the Study:** |
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- - Limited to **short-term persuasion effects**, without long-term follow-up. |
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- - Does not explore **the role of misinformation in political persuasion**. |
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-3. **Suggestions for Improvement:** |
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- - Future studies should track **long-term opinion changes** beyond immediate reactions. |
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- - Investigate **the role of digital media literacy in resisting persuasion**. |
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---- |
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-## **Relevance to Subproject** |
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-- Provides insights into **how digital media shapes political discourse**. |
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-- Highlights **which platforms and content types are most influential**. |
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-- Supports **research on misinformation and online political engagement**. |
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|
---- |
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-## **Suggestions for Further Exploration** |
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-1. Study how **fact-checking influences digital persuasion effects**. |
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-2. Investigate the **role of political influencers in shaping opinions**. |
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-3. Explore **long-term effects of social media exposure on political beliefs**. |
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---- |
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-## **Summary of Research Study** |
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-This study analyzes **how digital media influences political persuasion**, using **12 experimental studies**. The findings show that **video and interactive content are the most persuasive**, while **younger users are more susceptible to political messaging shifts**. The research emphasizes the **power of digital platforms in shaping public opinion and engagement**. |
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---- |
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-## **📄 Download Full Study** |
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+📄 Download Full Study |
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[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_joc_jqx021.pdf]] |
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-{{/expand}} |
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-{{html}}<hr style="border: 3px solid red;">{{/html}} |
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