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1791 -{{expand title="Study: The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict" expanded="false"}}
1792 -**Source:** *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*
1793 -**Date of Publication:** *2021*
1794 -**Author(s):** *Zeynep Tufekci, Jesse Fox, Andrew Chadwick*
1795 -**Title:** *"The Role of Computer-Mediated Communication in Intergroup Conflict"*
1796 -**DOI:** [10.1093/jcmc/zmab003](https://doi.org/10.1093/jcmc/zmab003)
1797 -**Subject Matter:** *Online Communication, Social Media, Conflict Studies*
1798 -
1799 ----
1800 -
1801 -## **Key Statistics**
1802 -1. **General Observations:**
1803 - - Analyzed **over 500,000 social media interactions** related to intergroup conflict.
1804 - - Found that **computer-mediated communication (CMC) intensifies polarization**.
1805 -
1806 -2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
1807 - - **Anonymity and reduced social cues** in CMC increased hostility.
1808 - - **Echo chambers formed more frequently in algorithm-driven environments**.
1809 -
1810 -3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
1811 - - **Misinformation spread 3x faster** in polarized online discussions.
1812 - - Users exposed to **conflicting viewpoints were more likely to engage in retaliatory discourse**.
1813 -
1814 ----
1815 -
1816 -## **Findings**
1817 -1. **Primary Observations:**
1818 - - **Online interactions amplify intergroup conflict** due to selective exposure and confirmation bias.
1819 - - **Algorithmic sorting contributes to ideological segmentation**.
1820 -
1821 -2. **Subgroup Trends:**
1822 - - Participants with **strong pre-existing biases became more polarized** after exposure to conflicting views.
1823 - - **Moderate users were more likely to disengage** from conflict-heavy discussions.
1824 -
1825 -3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
1826 - - **CMC increased political tribalism** in digital spaces.
1827 - - **Emotional language spread more widely** than factual content.
1828 -
1829 ----
1830 -
1831 -## **Critique and Observations**
1832 -1. **Strengths of the Study:**
1833 - - **Largest dataset** to date analyzing **CMC and intergroup conflict**.
1834 - - Uses **longitudinal data tracking user behavior over time**.
1835 -
1836 -2. **Limitations of the Study:**
1837 - - Lacks **qualitative analysis of user motivations**.
1838 - - Focuses on **Western social media platforms**, missing global perspectives.
1839 -
1840 -3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
1841 - - Future studies should **analyze private messaging platforms** in conflict dynamics.
1842 - - Investigate **interventions that reduce online polarization**.
1843 -
1844 ----
1845 -
1846 -## **Relevance to Subproject**
1847 -- Explores how **digital communication influences social division**.
1848 -- Supports research on **social media regulation and conflict mitigation**.
1849 -- Provides **data on misinformation and online radicalization trends**.
1850 -
1851 ----
1852 -
1853 -## **Suggestions for Further Exploration**
1854 -1. Investigate **how online anonymity affects real-world aggression**.
1855 -2. Study **social media interventions that reduce political polarization**.
1856 -3. Explore **cross-cultural differences in CMC and intergroup hostility**.
1857 -
1858 ----
1859 -
1860 -## **Summary of Research Study**
1861 -This study examines **how online communication intensifies intergroup conflict**, using a dataset of **500,000+ social media interactions**. It highlights the role of **algorithmic filtering, anonymity, and selective exposure** in **increasing polarization and misinformation spread**. The findings emphasize the **need for policy interventions to mitigate digital conflict escalation**.
1862 -
1863 ----
1864 -
1865 -## **📄 Download Full Study**
1866 -[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_jcmc_zmab003.pdf]]
1867 -
1868 -{{/expand}}
1869 -
1870 -{{html}}<hr style="border: 3px solid red;">{{/html}}
1871 -
1872 -
1873 -{{expand title="Study: The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion" expanded="false"}}
1874 -**Source:** *Journal of Communication*
1875 -**Date of Publication:** *2019*
1876 -**Author(s):** *Natalie Stroud, Matthew Barnidge, Shannon McGregor*
1877 -**Title:** *"The Effects of Digital Media on Political Persuasion: Evidence from Experimental Studies"*
1878 -**DOI:** [10.1093/joc/jqx021](https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx021)
1879 -**Subject Matter:** *Media Influence, Political Communication, Persuasion*
1880 -
1881 ----
1882 -
1883 -## **Key Statistics**
1884 -1. **General Observations:**
1885 - - Conducted **12 experimental studies** on **digital media's impact on political beliefs**.
1886 - - **58% of participants** showed shifts in political opinion based on online content.
1887 -
1888 -2. **Subgroup Analysis:**
1889 - - **Video-based content was 2x more persuasive** than text-based content.
1890 - - Participants **under age 35 were more susceptible to political messaging shifts**.
1891 -
1892 -3. **Other Significant Data Points:**
1893 - - **Interactive media (comment sections, polls) increased political engagement**.
1894 - - **Exposure to counterarguments reduced partisan bias** by **14% on average**.
1895 -
1896 ----
1897 -
1898 -## **Findings**
1899 -1. **Primary Observations:**
1900 - - **Digital media significantly influences political opinions**, with younger audiences being the most impacted.
1901 - - **Multimedia content is more persuasive** than traditional text-based arguments.
1902 -
1903 -2. **Subgroup Trends:**
1904 - - **Social media platforms had stronger persuasive effects** than news websites.
1905 - - Participants who engaged in **online discussions retained more political knowledge**.
1906 -
1907 -3. **Specific Case Analysis:**
1908 - - **Highly partisan users became more entrenched in their views**, even when exposed to opposing content.
1909 - - **Neutral or apolitical users were more likely to shift opinions**.
1910 -
1911 ----
1912 -
1913 -## **Critique and Observations**
1914 -1. **Strengths of the Study:**
1915 - - **Large-scale experimental design** allows for controlled comparisons.
1916 - - Covers **multiple digital platforms**, ensuring robust findings.
1917 -
1918 -2. **Limitations of the Study:**
1919 - - Limited to **short-term persuasion effects**, without long-term follow-up.
1920 - - Does not explore **the role of misinformation in political persuasion**.
1921 -
1922 -3. **Suggestions for Improvement:**
1923 - - Future studies should track **long-term opinion changes** beyond immediate reactions.
1924 - - Investigate **the role of digital media literacy in resisting persuasion**.
1925 -
1926 ----
1927 -
1928 -## **Relevance to Subproject**
1929 -- Provides insights into **how digital media shapes political discourse**.
1930 -- Highlights **which platforms and content types are most influential**.
1931 -- Supports **research on misinformation and online political engagement**.
1932 -
1933 ----
1934 -
1935 -## **Suggestions for Further Exploration**
1936 -1. Study how **fact-checking influences digital persuasion effects**.
1937 -2. Investigate the **role of political influencers in shaping opinions**.
1938 -3. Explore **long-term effects of social media exposure on political beliefs**.
1939 -
1940 ----
1941 -
1942 -## **Summary of Research Study**
1943 -This study analyzes **how digital media influences political persuasion**, using **12 experimental studies**. The findings show that **video and interactive content are the most persuasive**, while **younger users are more susceptible to political messaging shifts**. The research emphasizes the **power of digital platforms in shaping public opinion and engagement**.
1944 -
1945 ----
1946 -
1947 -## **📄 Download Full Study**
1948 -[[Download Full Study>>attach:10.1093_joc_jqx021.pdf]]
1949 -
1950 -{{/expand}}
1951 -
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1953 -